reviews contributions in distortionary costs of taxation, estimating that the cost per incremental dollar of government spending is $2.65. Kaplow (1996) favors the supply of a public good whenever the benefit/cost ratio exceeds one, contrary to the orthodox position that has existed since Pigou (1928) . This paper largely reconciles these two opposing positions. The large distortionary costs exist on the revenue side, but are largely offset by the negative distortionary costs on the spending side or by the distributional gain. Kaplow's and Feldstein's arguments have to be subject to important qualifications. Additional arguments relevant to "How big should the public spending be?" are also reviewed. Environmental disruption effects, burden-free taxes on diamond goods, and relative-income effects all favor more public spending.
INTRODUCTION
" -it is optimal to supply the public good whenever the simple cost-benefit test [i.e. benefit/cost ratio of one or above] is satisfied." -L. Kaplow (1996) .
"A dollar of government outlay may have a total cost, including the deadweight loss (or marginal distortionary costs), that exceeds two dollars" -M. Feldstein (1997) .
A s may be seen from the quotes above, two important articles appeared in the National Tax Journal within a matter of months, addressing 'the central public finance question facing any country-the appropriate size of its government' (Feldstein, 1997, p. 197) . However, the two papers appear to reach almost completely opposite conclusions. Kaplow argues that the benefit/cost ratio for a public project need only to exceed one for it to be efficient to be provided, instead of the higher ratio to allow for the distortionary costs of raising government revenue to finance for the project. Other things being equal, this argument tends to favor a higher level of public spending. 1 On the other hand, Feldstein argues that the marginal cost of public revenue may be considerably higher than commonly supposed due to some neglected behavioral adjustments by economic actors. This suggests that a benefit/cost ratio much higher than one (perhaps as high as 2.65) should be used for public projects, hence a much lower level of public spending. The purpose of this paper is partly to reconcile this apparent inconsistency and partly to consider some other relevant issues affecting the appropriate benefit/cost ratio for and the optimal level of public spending. It is argued that the arguments of both Kaplow and Feldstein are important and relevant to the central public-finance question of the appropriate size of public spending. Putting their arguments together suggests some intermediate level of public spending. However, there are other considerations (relative-income effects, environmental disruption effects, and diamond goods) that suggest a higher level of public spending.
A BRIEF BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
The conventional view of economists regarding the central public finance problem is that the optimal level of public spending should be less than that indicated by the use of the simple benefit/cost ratio of one, since the financing of public revenue involves distortionary costs. Both Kaplow and Feldstein note that this conventional view dates from at least the time of Pigou (1928) , who stated that the benefits of public goods must exceed their direct costs by an amount sufficient to outweigh the distortionary cost (also called deadweight loss or excess burden) of taxation. An authoritative modern textbook (Stiglitz, 1988, p. 140 ) puts the Pigovian principle this way: "Since it becomes more costly to obtain public goods when taxation imposes distortions, nor-mally this will imply that the efficient level of public goods is smaller than it would have been with nondistortionary taxation." It is known that this general rule is subject to qualifications due to the presence of considerations like second best, including complementarity/substitutarity between public and private goods. (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980; King, 1986; Batina, 1990; and Chang, 1997 .) Wilson (1991) goes as far as establishing a case where the second-best public-goods level exceeds the first-best level. However, he assumes the feasibility of financing public spending through a general lump-sum tax (or a reduction in the lump-sum subsidy), without which Wilson (1991, p.153) himself recognizes, the abnormal case 'normally will not happen.' Christiansen (1981) identifies a set of sufficient conditions for the applicability of the simple benefit/cost ratio of one: namely, similar individual preferences, except for the influence of different earning abilities (a standard assumption in the Mirrlees framework), weak separability of the public good and the numeraire private good from leisure/work, the absence of commodity taxation (in whose presence an additional condition on the independence of the marginal valuation of the public good is needed), and the operation of an optimal (in general) non-linear income tax. Using the self-selection approach (a high-ability person may choose to work less and pay less tax), Boadway and Keen (1993) derive a modified (Samuelsonian) benefit/cost rule for public goods, explaining and confirming Christiansen's important result for the specific case. Using his approach to analyze commodity tax reform, Konishi (1995) generalizes Christiansen's result to any smooth non-linear income tax, optimal or not. Thus, in an important sense, a case for the simple benefit/cost rule for public goods is already contained in Christiansen's. However, the results of Christiansen and his followers are presented as a special case (of weak separability), while Kaplow argues for the simple benefit/cost ratio as the benchmark, presumably regarding the deviations caused by non-separability (which may go either way) as a secondary complication that should be disregarded in the basic analysis and probably in most realworld applications (where the sign of the required deviation may not be known). (This is similar in spirit to the theory of third best expounded by Ng, 1977; 1979 / 1983 Moreover, Kaplow argues for his principle in a very simple and intuitive way accessible to non-specialists. Thus, we may refer to the Christensen result as the applicability of the simple benefit/cost test in the case of weak separability and to the Kaplow principle as the argument for using the simple test as the benchmark in the above sense.
Kaplow's paper has attracted a prominent comment by Browning and Liu (1998) , who correctly show that, even in cases satisfying Kaplow's conditions, income taxes do distort in the sense that each taxpayer would prefer paying a lump sum tax of the same amount. However, Browning and Liu (1998, p.105 ) explicitly agree that "a public good can be financed with higher income tax rates without affecting labor supply" and that the marginal cost of (public) fund then equals one. Person-specific lump sum taxes are not practically feasible while a universal poll tax is distributionally regressive. Moreover, this paper is concerned with the appropriate marginal cost of public fund or the appropriate benefit/ cost ratios for public goods and the related optimal size of public spending, especially in a wider perspective, taking account of related issues not considered by any of the authors mentioned. Thus, this paper will not focus on Browning and Liu's valid observation. Nevertheless, it may be noted that our reconciliation of Kaplow and Feldstein is consistent with Browning and Liu. In particular, that the tax itself may still be distortive is allowed for. Moreover, the second half of Appendix A explains graphically why the distortion (in comparison to a lump sum tax) and the marginal cost of fund apparently differ.
KAPLOW'S ARGUMENT
While some recent literature has qualified the Pigou principle as discussed above, a whole scale onslaught is presented by Kaplow. He argues that public goods can be financed without additional distortion by using an adjustment to the income tax that offsets the benefits of the public good. The "preexisting income tax schedule is adjusted so that, at each income level, the tax change just offsets the benefits from the public good. By construction, an individual's net reward from any level of work effort will be unaltered; any reduction in disposable income due to the tax adjustment is balanced by the benefits from the public good. Because an individual's after-tax utility as a function of his work effort will thus be unchanged, his choice of work effort-and utility level -will also be unaffected" (Kaplow, 1996, p. 514) .
For example, if the benefit of a public good is proportional to the income level of the taxpayer, it may be financed by a (or an increase in) proportional income tax. The proportional income tax itself may involve a disincentive effect. However, the tax plus the public good together involve no disincentive effect. For example, suppose the benefit of police protection of properties is proportional to the income level of the taxpayers. With a higher degree of police protection financed by a higher proportional income tax, a person benefits more (in comparison to a lower degree of protection and lower tax) and pays more by the same amount if they earn more, leaving the incentive structure unaffected.
If the benefit of a public good is a constant amount across all income levels, but it is financed by a proportional income tax, then a disincentive effect may be involved. But then "it will be accompanied by a countervailing change in redistributive benefits that has been ignored" (Kaplow, 1996, p. 525) . To this observation, it may be added that, in the reversed case, e.g., where a public good with benefit proportional to income is financed by a lump sum tax, a negative redistributive benefit will be involved, but it will be accompanied by a negative disincentive effect, reasonably assuming that a tax increasing in income is already in existence for redistributive purposes. If the income tax schedule has been designed to approximately achieve an optimal balance between the redistributive benefits and the distortive costs of taxation, the redistributive benefits (positive or negative) of nonbenefit-proportional financing of a (nonhuge) public good will be approximately offset by its distortionary costs (positive or negative). For a huge public good or the cumulative effects of a large number of public goods, either benefit-proportional financing may be used or a change to the income tax schedule may be made to redress any significant divergence between redistributive benefits and the distortionary costs of taxation.
When the benefits of the public goods increase with the income level, it may be interpreted as a case where there is significant complementarity between the public good and the taxed goods. In this case, apart from the results of Christiansen and others discussed above, some recent analysis allows for certain offsetting effects on the extent of distortionary costs. (Intuitively, an increase in public goods then increases the demand for the taxed goods, generating more tax revenue and offsetting the underconsumption of these taxed goods.) However, while this complementarity is unambiguous in reducing the distortionary costs, it is ambiguous in affecting the optimal size of public good provision due to the following counteracting effect. An increase in public good provision necessitates higher taxes on the taxed goods, leading to higher prices of these goods, which reduces the marginal valuation on and hence the optimal size of the public good through complementarity. Substitutability has the reversed effects. (Batina, 1990; and Chang, 1997.) Since the Kaplow principle is concerned with the size of the required benefit/cost ratio for public goods rather than on the level of public spending directly, it is not affected by the counteracting effect through complementarity on the marginal valuation on public goods. Moreover, most of the recent contributions in optimal taxation/expenditure, using a single representative consumer model, ignore the countervailing change in redistributive benefits for cases where the distortionary costs are not offset by complementarity to become zero. 2
THE PRINCIPLE OF "A DOLLAR IS A DOLLAR"
The argument of Kaplow may be compared with my argument (Ng, 1979. App. 9A; and 1984) for treating a dollar as a dollar whomsoever it goes to or comes from (in particular, irrespective of income groups) in the assessment of any change, policy, project, etc. (except in the general income tax/transfer system). If a project benefits the rich by $10m and costs the poor $8m, the pure efficiency principle of a dollar as a dollar dictates its adoption, but most people will not regard it as desirable. However, it is Pareto-superior to adopt the project and adjust the tax schedule such that the rich have to pay $9m more and the poor have to pay/receive $9m less/more. Most economists do not believe that this is Pareto superior, because making the tax schedule more progressive increases the disincentive effects of taxation. This belief ignores the fact that the policy of rejecting such a project also has higher disincentive effects. For any alternative A that adopts a pure equality (or any other non-efficiency) principle, a (quasi) Pareto-superior alternative B could be constructed by replacing the non-efficiency principle with the efficiency principle (a dollar is a dollar) and by adjusting the income tax/transfer schedule to offset the effects of the replacement so that each income group is made no worse off and government revenue increases.
Despite the similarity of my argument, summarized above, and Kaplow's argument (both involving offsetting income tax/transfer adjustment), I must admit that I failed to see the Kaplow principle (that the benefit/cost ratio for public goods only need to exceed one) for two decades after formulating my "a dollar is a dollar" principle (seminar presentations at Monash in 1976, at VPI, New York, and Yale in 1978 ; the principle appears so right wing that the paper could not be published until 1984) until I read Kaplow. In a sense, one may say that the Kaplow principle is a specific application of the "a dollar is a dollar" principle to the case of public goods/projects. Since a dollar should be treated as a dollar whomsoever it goes to or comes from, the costs and benefits of any project (private or public) should be counted equally, and hence the benefit/cost ratio needs only exceed one for any project (private or public). However, before reading Kaplow, I thought that requiring the benefit/cost ratio for a public good to exceed one by a sufficient margin was based on the efficiency principle as a dollar of public revenue costs the economy more than one dollar. In other words, I accepted the conventional position here completely. Thus, I find Kaplow's paper extremely important and hope that it will be given the attention it deserves.
One obvious qualification to the Kaplow principle and the principle of "a dollar is a dollar" is: What if the higher public spending cannot be financed by offsetting benefit taxation and if the existing progressivity in income tax/transfer system is not optimal or cannot be adjusted to offset the shift to the efficiency principle, due to political constraints or other factors? While we may try to do good by stealth in the short run and proceed to use distributional weights, in the long run this will be known and cause disincentive effects. Moreover, the same political forces that prevent the increase in progressivity may then work to decrease the degree of progressivity, as actually happened in many countries in the past few decades, when incentives were reduced by the use of distributional weights and other non-efficiency, purely equalityoriented policies. We then end up with less efficiency and no more equality. (See Ng, 1984 for more details.)
Kaplow also mentions two qualifications to his simple analysis, which also apply to my "a dollar is a dollar" principle. However, neither qualification affects the central thrust of either the Kaplow principle or the principle of "a dollar is a dollar." First, when second-best considerations, such as different degrees of complementarity with leisure, are taken into account, the simple cost-benefit rule or the "a dollar is a dollar" principle should be adjusted or be defined to include such indirect costs/benefits through second best or external effects. It might then, for example, be argued "that there should be smaller public libraries than otherwise would be efficient, because libraries make leisure more attractive, reinforcing the adverse incentive effect of the income tax. Conversely, there perhaps should be greater police protection of private property than otherwise would be efficient, because this increases the value of goods that are purchased from the fruits of labor . . . This qualification does not justify the type of adjustment to cost-benefit analysis" (Kaplow, 1996, p.518) , requiring a higher benefit/cost ratio for all public goods or requiring a distributional weighting system favoring the poor and against the rich for all specific cases. (For the case of libraries, I believe that there are counteracting benefits, including indirect external economies and merit goods, justifying higher levels of provision. But this is a separate issue. On indirect externalities, see Ng, 1975.) The second qualification refers to heterogeneity of preferences for people on the same income. It is not feasible to design income tax schedules and public spending programs that differ between people on the same income but of different preferences. Thus, the construction of compensating tax/transfer changes in either Kaplow's or my argument can only make people on each income as a group no worse off. People who differ in preference significantly from the average (at that income level) one way or the other may either gain or lose. However, the gainers within each income level could compensate the losers fully (with some overall gains left over). This is called a quasi-Pareto social improvement in Ng (1984) . Objections to the compensation tests are mainly based on the distributional consideration that a gain valued at two million dollars by the rich need not be more important than a loss valued at one million dollars by the poor if the compensation is not actually paid. For a quasi-Pareto social improvement, full compensation is possible within each group of the same income level. The richpoor issue does not apply. (The minor problem of possible inconsistency in the application of compensation tests is also discussed in Ng, 1984.) Thus, the problem of heterogeneity of preferences does not cause a big problem. A more important qualification (on page 260) to the Kaplow principle (but not to the "a dollar is a dollar" principle) is related to some considerations emphasized by Feldstein outlined below. Feldstein (1997) presents the orthodox position (though not yet fully used by the Treasury Department, it is the academically accepted position) on the distortionary costs of taxation most comprehensively and clearly, reviewing some very important contributions by himself and other researchers (including Auten and Carroll, 1994; Ballard, Shoven, and Whalley, 1985; Browning, 1987; Feldstein, 1995a Feldstein, , 1995b Feldstein and Feenberg, 1996; Slemrod and Yitshake, 1996; and Stuart, 1984) . At the risk of simplification, Feldstein's position may be summarized by the following quotation.
FELDSTEIN'S ARGUMENT
"First, higher tax rates may reduce the supply of labor and, in the longer run, the supply of capital . . . Second, higher tax rates change the forms in which individuals take their compensation. A higher marginal tax rate on labor income induces a substitution of untaxed fringe benefits and more pleasant working conditions for taxable cash income . . . [Third,] higher marginal tax rates reduce taxable income by inducing more spending on things that are tax deductible (including . . . charitable gifts, and health care) . . . many economists believe that an increase in tax rates would cause only a small deadweight loss . . . as a "small" triangle . . . That line of reasoning is wrong for four reasons. First, the deadweight loss caused by a change in tax rates is not a small triangle but a much larger trapezoid because we start with an existing tax distortion . . . Second, the relevant labor supply elasticity is much larger than the traditional estimates imply . . . Third, . . . other ways of reducing taxable income . . . [Fourth, the] same kind of wasteful distortion is also true for spending on things that are tax deduct-ible … The total cost per incremental dollar of government spending, including the revenue and the deadweight loss, is thus a very high $2.65. Equivalently, it implies that the marginal distortionary costs per dollar of revenue are $1.65." (Feldstein, 1997, pp. 201, 209-11) .
RECONCILING KAPLOW AND FELDSTEIN
As mentioned in the opening paragraph of this paper, the positions of Kaplow and Feldstein ( and that of most other economists, including myself before I read Kaplow) appear to be diametrically opposite, with Kaplow arguing for the adequacy of the simple benefit/cost principle and Feldstein emphasizing the need to account for the big deadweight loss of raising revenue for public spending. However, I wish to argue in this section that we may adopt an interpretation that makes both sides basically correct, subject to some important qualifications.
Subject to an important (but relatively minor) comment mentioned below, Feldstein is basically correct that, given the various ways individuals adjust to the higher tax rates, raising an additional dollar of public revenue (by say a marginal proportionate increase in tax rates across the board) on its own does impose, in general, significant (say 100 percent) distortionary costs over and above the revenue collected. However, this does not mean that the benefit/cost ratio for a public project has to exceed two. There are offsetting benefits at the spending side (on top of the direct benefits of the public goods). 3 If the valuation of the higher public spending is the same as the extent of the higher taxes at each and every in-come level, then the higher disincentive effects of the higher taxes will be exactly (subject to the qualifications mentioned above and another qualification to be mentioned presently) offset to give no net increase in disincentive effects, as shown by Kaplow. This is so because when people reckon in terms of the total package of the higher taxes and spending, the gains offset the losses at each income group. Putting it differently, the fact that people at higher income levels place higher values on the public goods makes the spending side possess negative disincentive effects or positive incentive effects, offsetting the disincentive effects of the higher taxes, when the higher taxes do cause disincentive effects. 4 On the other hand, if the degree at which the valuation of the higher public spending increases with income is less than the degree at which higher taxes increases with income, such that there are higher disincentive effects for the total package (of higher taxes and higher spending), there exist offsetting distributional gains (since the poor gain and the rich lose in net terms). In the opposite case, where the poor lose and the rich gain in net terms, there are distributional losses. But then the combined disincentive effects of the total package are negative. In any of these three cases, the Kaplow principle applies.
The fact that the cost of raising a dollar of public revenue is larger than one does not mean that the benefit/cost ratio for public projects must be larger than one. The two are different, though similar and related concepts. As a referee points out, the idea of the distortionary costs of taxation is to hypothetically return the government revenue to individuals (or to use lump sum taxes instead of distortionary taxation), while the optimal size of public revenue does not involve such hypothetical income return from the government to individuals. Rather, the revenue raised is to pay for the public goods. Thus, the effects of both the taxation side and the spending side have to be considered together.
Tax Evasion and other Non-Leisure Behavioral Responses
Apart from the qualifications mentioned previously, the Kaplow principle is subject to another important qualification. (See also Appendix C for another more complicated consideration.) Kaplow's basic analysis ignores (though he touches on the issue) the behavioral responses to higher taxes except through the income (consumption) / leisure choice. As Feldstein (1997) emphasizes, there are other responses, including substitution into less tax-assessable spending like luxurious offices. This encouragement of inefficient choices does increase the distortionary costs of higher taxes despite Kaplow's argument. Higher taxes encourage people at almost all income levels (especially those facing high marginal tax rates) to use less-beneficial though more tax (avoidance)-effective ways of spending money. This extra distortion is not offset by any extra benefit of the higher public spending. This qualification to the Kaplow principle applies also to illegal means of tax evasion: higher tax rates encourage more evasion. Here, the loss in tax revenue itself is not a distortionary cost as it is offset by the gain of the taxpayers. The distortionary cost consists of the fact that the taxpayers would prefer to have the higher incomes legally, without having to go into the dubious, time-consuming, and likely less beneficial means that are more taxeffective. In practice, this may be the most important qualification to the Kaplow principle.
A query may arise: Why do the higher benefits of the higher public spending financed by the higher compensatory taxes offset the higher tax-rates to produce neutrality (no extra disincentive effect) in income/leisure choice but do not offset the higher tax-rates to also produce neutrality in tax evasion and other similar choices? This is so because if an income earner decides to have more leisure and earn less income, they forego not only the after-tax income but also the benefits (e.g. protection of more property) associated with higher incomes. (For the case where the benefits from public spending are related to the publicly unobservable earning abilities rather than incomes, a qualification may be needed as discussed in Appendix C.) On the other hand, when a person under-reports the income they actually do earn, they do not forego, by and large, the benefits (from higher public spending) associated with higher (actual) incomes. Those parts of the benefits of higher public spending that only apply to reported incomes will in fact offset the higher tax-rates and reduce the incentives for tax evasion. If all the benefits depend on reported rather than actual incomes, then the qualification to the Kaplow principle being discussed is not needed.
It may be noted that the above qualification to the Kaplow principle due to non-leisure behavioral responses need not apply to the principle of "a dollar is a dollar," for the following consideration. While higher taxes/transfers on the rich/ poor in lieu of specific equality-oriented policies tend to encourage more tax evasion and avoidance, the specific equalityoriented policies themselves also encourage evasion and avoidance. Just as one may pretend to be on low income to pay less tax, one may also pretend to be on low income to have access to specific benefits for low income-earners. Unless there is asymmetry in the extent of losses in the wrong direction, no qualification to the principle of "a dollar is a dollar" is needed here. I discussed this and similar issues under 'transaction costs' in Ng (1984 Ng ( , pp. 1040 and concluded that the asymmetry is actually in the right direction, with a fortiori case against specific equality-oriented policies.
Another query may arise: Why is the Kaplow principle subject to the qualification of non-leisure behavioral responses while the principle of "a dollar is a dollar" is not? This may be explained thus. The more progressive tax/transfer system used in the argument for the principle of "a dollar is a dollar" is in lieu of a system of specific purely equality-oriented policies that is itself subject to similar behavioral responses. For the Kaplow principle, the higher taxes are used to finance for extra public spending that does not yet exist. The losses due to the behavioral responses to the higher tax rates have to be taken into account in assessing whether the extra public spending is worth undertaking.
Encouragement-Intended and Non-Intended Activities
The argument of Feldstein regarding the extra distortionary costs due to the various non-leisure responses of individuals has itself to be subject to an important qualification. Two different types (for simplicity, we take the two polar types, though various degrees of mixture of the two types may be involved in practice) of (legal or illegal) tax-free (or lower taxrates) spending should be distinguished. First, there are various items that the government wants to (or should) encourage for some social purposes, including the efficiency consideration of external benefits (e.g. health care, the prevention of communicable diseases in particular) and the distributional one of poverty reduction (e.g. charitable gifts). If the higher taxes encourage people to genuinely spend more on these items that the soci-ety wants to encourage, there is no extra deadweight loss. (If the increase in taxes is so huge that the extra spending becomes too excessive, the degree of tax deductibility may need to be reduced to revert to optimality.) This is so because the reduced benefits to the taxpayers are offset by the increased gains of external benefits or distributional benefits.
Secondly, the higher tax rates may also encourage people to spend more on those items that the government does not really want to encourage, but nevertheless has to treat as tax-deductible due to the difficulties of distinguishing them from items that genuinely should qualify for tax-deductibility. These include (but may not be confined to): 1. Pretended, non-genuine spending on deductible items, e.g. claiming private dining as business expenses; 2. Excess spending on deductible items, e.g. big offices. These types of spending create extra distortionary costs, as explained by Feldstein. They do not produce compensating benefits, such as external or distributional benefits, like the first type of tax-free spending.
Even without accepting Kaplow's argument, the estimation of the distortionary costs of taxation should reflect those due to behavioral changes of the second (encouragement-not-intended) type but not the first (encouragement-intended) type. Feldstein include items like charitable gifts and health care in his discussion of behavioral responses. These items largely belong to the encouragement-intended type. Also, his method of estimating taxable income elasticities (used in turn to estimate the distortionary costs) by the blanket comparison of actual tax revenues before and after tax-rate changes necessarily lump the two types of response together. Thus, if the method is used, a separate estimate of the part due to the first type of response should be made and deducted from the total to give an appropriate estimate of the true distortionary costs, before considering Kaplow's point. The need for the separate treatment of the two types of response is established in a more formal analysis in Appendix A.
FURTHER ARGUMENTS
In addition to the Kaplow principle and the qualification to Feldstein's high estimate of the deadweight loss of taxation, there are a number of considerations indicating lower distortionary costs of raising public revenue and higher optimal level of public spending.
Environmental Disruption May Make Taxes Corrective
As mentioned above, Feldstein (1997, p. 209) argues that "the deadweight loss caused by a change in tax rates is not a small triangle but a much larger trapezoid because we start with an existing tax distortion." This is a valid argument within the orthodox framework where taxes are raised just to pay for public spending and serves no other useful purpose. Within this framework, it is also quantitatively a very important consideration as the existing level of tax revenue accounts for more than 30 percent of GDP for many countries. However, there is one consideration that may offset this important factor. In the production and/or consumption of most if not all goods and services, significant environmental disruption effects (including pollution, deforestation, littering, and congestion) are created either directly or indirectly (through intermediate goods). Few, if any, corrective taxes have been imposed on these activities. Thus, the usual income and consumption taxes, while designed for revenue-raising purposes, may serve as a rough correction to the environmental disruption effects of production and consumption. While the rate structures are far less than ideal in an abstract sense, this is a much smaller problem when the issue of feasibility and/or administrative costs are taken into ac-count, though higher tax-rates on more disruptive activities should still be imposed. Given the severity of the environmental problems (recalling the recent report of the big ice crack in the Antarctica due to global warming) and the very longterm nature of the effects, an average corrective tax-rate of around 30 percent may not be excessive, though more reliable estimates should be done. At least, this consideration significantly offsets the trapezoid effect of higher tax rates, if not making the distortionary costs of taxation negative! (It is true that the existence of pre-existing distortions in the economy, like monopolistic power, may increase the degree of the taxation distortion, as shown by Browning (1994) . However, other types of distortion, like excessive safety regulations, have neutral or negative effects (see Kaplow, 1998; and Ng, 1977) .
Burden-Free Taxes
Another factor reducing the distortionary costs of raising public revenue is the existence of burden-free taxes. There are goods taxes on which create not only no excess burden, but no burden at all. These are pure diamond goods or goods valued for their values rather their intrinsic consumption effects. As prices increase due to higher taxes on these goods, consumers may just spend the same amounts to buy the same values without real losses. The revenues raised are pure gains. (See Ng, 1987a for details.) The existence of burden-free taxes and taxes with negative excess burdens mean that the marginal cost of public fund is lower, making the optimal level of public spending higher.
Relative-Income Effects
The orthodox framework also assumes that, given the non-economic factors, the utility of an individual is mainly a function of their absolute (real) income. This is a good approximation at low income levels. However, for many countries in the world now, most people have by far surpassed the level of absolute poverty. (This implies neither the non-existence of some absolute poverty nor the unimportance of the problem of relative poverty.) For this majority of people, the relative income levels are very important, if not more important than the absolute income levels. Moreover, with further growth, relative income becomes more and more important relative to absolute income. It is well known that Veblen (1899) discussed the importance of relative income. (Less wellknown is that John Rae (1834) did that decades earlier. See Ng and Wang, 1993 for a brief survey.) However, virtually all economists ignore the implications of this on practical issues like the distortionary costs of taxation.
For a single person, an increase in income increases both their absolute and relative incomes. It is thus perceived to be very important. Thus, despite high income levels, most people still engage in the rat-race for making more money. For the whole society, an increase in the income levels of all proportionately leaves the relative income levels unchanged. For non-proportionate increases, the increases in relative income of some are on average offset by the decreases in relative income of some others. Thus, the society cannot increase the relative income levels of its members on average. The society (especially the world society) should be less concerned with economic growth as such and more with improving the environment and other welfare-improving methods than individuals on average. However, partly because of insufficient understanding of the implications of relative income, partly because of politicians' myopic response to the individuals' ratrace for more money, and partly because of international competition, economic growth is emphasized to the inadequate regard of the more important questions of environmental protection (to a large extent, a global public good) and public spending that may really improve welfare. The usual method of estimating the optimal level of public spending (equating the sum of individual marginal valuations to the marginal cost, with or without taking into account the distortionary costs of taxation) is likely to lead to a sub-optimal level. In most estimates, the marginal benefit of private expenditure is likely to betaken to include the absolute-income or intrinsic consumption effects plus the internal or direct relative income effect (as these two taken together constitute the worth of a private good as it appears to each individual), but not to include the negative external or indirect relative income effects. This creates an overemphasis in favor of private expenditure, leading to a sub-optimal level of public spending (Ng, 1987b) . The fact that the classmates of one's child all receive expensive birthday gifts and one's peers all drive expensive cars make such private spending very important, inflating the marginal valuation on private consumption relative to that placed on public goods.
A question arises as to how the interaction of the relative-income effects and the environmental disruption effects affect the optimal level and rule for public spending. This is analyzed in Appendix B, where it is shown that not only do both effects counteract the disincentive effects of taxation, but the environmental disruption effects may have to be counted twice: once in the counteraction to the disincentive effect (since taxes are largely corrective) and once by itself (since public spending reduces the private spending and hence environmental disruptions). (cf. The argument by Fisher and van Marrewijk (1998) that a pollution tax yields a double dividend because it reduces pollution and increases growth due to the public input nature of clean air.)
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Putting the above arguments together, it means that, in estimating the distortionary costs of taxation for determining the appropriate excess (of unity) benefit/cost ratio for public spending, the relevant positive (i.e. in favor of a positive excess) effects are the non-income responses of type two (those not purposefully encouraged by the society) and the relevant negative effects, which include the existence of burden-free taxes, the bias due to the importance of relativeincome effects, and the corrective nature of most existing taxes due to environmental disruption of most production and consumption. For most developed countries, it appears that relative-income effects and diamond goods are important, and increasingly so. Also, as a clean environment is almost certainly a very superior good, the concern about environment disruption is increasing. Thus, their combined effects may well outweigh the positive effects of behavioural responses traditionally emphasized by economists. Thus, before a reasonable estimation of these opposing effects, it is difficult to say whether the appropriate benefit/cost ratio for public spending should exceed or fall short of unity. I agree with Feldstein (1997, p. 197 ) that the "central public finance question facing any country is the appropriate size of its government," and that economists should put more effort in trying to help answer this question. Our discussion indicates that both a comprehensive consideration taking all relevant issues into account and much more quantitative estimation of the relevant factors are needed. It is shown in this appendix more formally that, where the higher tax rates encourage people to substitute into tax-deductible items that the society purposefully wants to encourage (e.g., charity and health care), no distortionary cost is involved, without the consideration of the Kaplow principle. For simplicity, we adopt a simple model in which the utility of the representative individual is a function of their income y, leisure x, government spending on public goods g, the average level of some activity or variable that the society wants to encourage E (environmental quality maintenance effort, charity contribution, etc., in average value over all individuals), and the individual's own contribution to or participation in this activity e. For example, while I benefit from the overall or average level of charity contribution, I also take pride in my own contribution. The individual then takes g and E as beyond their control and maximizes with respect to y, x, e:
[A1] U = U (y, x, g, E, e) subject to their budget constraint
where t = income-tax rate (assumed constant for simplicity; a constant level of guaranteed income could be added without affecting the analysis below), s = subsidy rate on e, and the wage rate and the price of e have both been normalized to unity by the appropriate choice of units. Assuming the satisfaction of the second-order conditions (compelling in the current model), this maximization problem gives the following first-order conditions:
where a subscript denotes partial differentiation, e.g., U x ≡ ∂U/∂x.
Either ignoring distributional considerations for simplicity or assuming a case of similar individuals, the government maximizes U with respect to g, t, and s, subject to its budget constraint:
where the given number of individuals N is normalized to unity; the multiplication of N to the R.H.S. of [A4] does not affect the analysis. (Available from the author is an analysis, producing the same results, in terms of a continuous distribution of individuals of different earning abilities a la Mirrlees (1971) .) Since [A1] and [A2] still hold as g changes, we may differentiate them with respect to g. The differentiation of [A1] with respect to g gives:
[A5] dU/dg = U y (dy/dg) + U x (dx/dg) + U g + U E (dE/de)(de/dg) + U e (de/dg) Note that, while ∂E/∂e is negligible, dE/de is not. (It should in fact equal unity.) One person's marginal contribution makes a negligible effect on the average; all persons' marginal contributions make a significant effect.
The differentiation of [A2] with respect to g gives:
[A6] dy/dg = e(ds/dg) -(1 -s)(de/dg) 
Since the government budget constraint [A4] must hold before and after a change in g, we may totally differentiate it, yielding
In [A9] U g is the marginal utility of an increase in government spending g without considering its financing and other indirect effects; dU/dg is the marginal utility of an increase in g taking all effects into account. Assuming continuity, optimal supply of g requires setting [A9] to zero, giving:
[A10] U g /U y = 1 + t(dx/dg) + s(de/dg)
To examine the meaning of [A10], first ignore the last two terms. If the higher tax rate (to finance the higher government spending g) causes a disincentive effect, leisure x increases, making dx/dg positive. If pre-existing tax rate t is already positive, this causes a significant distortion. Hence, in assessing the desirability of public project, the benefit to cost ratio U g / U y has to exceed one by the amount t(dx/dg). (See the last paragraph of this appendix for details.) This is the orthodox position since Pigou. Kaplow's argument is that, even if the higher tax side produces a disincentive effect, it will be offset by the spending side so that the total package (of higher tax and higher public spending) does not have distortionary costs, if higher taxes at various income levels correspond to the higher benefits of the higher spending. If not, the increase/decrease in distortionary costs will be offset by a distributional gain/loss. Feldstein and others emphasize that higher taxes also encourage people to respond by spending more on tax-deductible items like luxurious offices and charitable gifts and that such responses also cause distortionary costs. My point is that the shift into charitable gifts and other items that the society wants to encourage does not cause distortionary costs (assuming that the rate of subsidy or tax-deductibility is not excessive), while the extra spending on deductible items like luxurious offices and other evasions that the society does not want to encourage does create distortionary costs. In order not to burden the model above with too many notations, I have used the activity e as either encouragement-intended items (type I) or encouragement not-intended items (type II). For the latter, we take U E to be zero (e.g., the luxurious offices do not benefit other individuals in the society); for the former, we take U E to be positive (e.g., environmental cleanliness or charitable contributions benefit the society). From the last two terms in [A10], it can be seen that, if the higher public spending g leads (through the financing of it) to an increase in the subsidized or tax-deductible activities of type II, the benefit/cost ratio U g /U y of public spending has to exceed unity by the positive amount s(de/dg), even if we accept Kaplow's argument and take dx/dg = 0. The Kaplow principle has thus to be qualified in addition to the considerations of preference heterogeneity and second best. However, for type I activities, U E > 0. Moreover, if the rate of subsidy s is at the appropriate level, s = (U E /U y )(dE/de). Then, the last two terms in [A10] cancel each other. Thus, the shift into encouragement-intended activities (charitable gifts, etc.) due to a higher public spending (and the financing of it) does not create distortionary costs. Feldstein's argument and estimation of the deadweight loss of taxation have to be qualified accordingly.
Ignoring the last two terms in the R.H.S. of [A10], the rationale for the traditional second term t(dx/dg) or t(dx/dR) where R = revenue if we are concerned with the revenue side only, may be explained intuitively with reference to Figure 1 , the familiar consumption (or post-tax income)/leisure choice diagram.
The individual is initially at the pre-tax equilibrium point A. A proportionate income tax shifts their opportunity line from PL to PK and their equilibrium point from A to B, B', and B" respectively, depending on dx/dg =, >, < 0. For the case of B, the amount of revenue collected (AB) accurately measures the loss in consumption in shifting the individual from point A on the indifference curve I 1 to point B on an indifference curve (not drawn) passing through B. Thus, this corresponds to dx/dg = 0, and U g / U y = 1 in [A10]. For the case of B', the amount of leisure x increases with the tax and the amount of tax revenue collected CB' understates the equivalent (to the shift from A to B') reduction in consumption from A to E. Hence, U g /U y exceeds one in [A10]. The reverse is true for the case of B" where the tax revenue DB" overstates the equivalent consumption loss AF. The fact that a further marginal increase in tax rate imposes excess burden proportional to preexisting t and marginal dx/dR (rather than previous change in x) may be analyzed with reference to Figure 2 .
Here, a marginal increase in tax rate shifts the opportunity line further from PK to PJ (exaggerated for graphical clarity). The increase in tax revenue collected is DC', being EC' minus AB (=ED), rather than HC'. The difference of HD depends on MN, the marginal dx/dR (rather than the pre-existing dx/dR which equals zero in Figure 2 as A and B are on the same vertical line) and on the size of pre-existing tax rate t. The case of a negative marginal dx/dR (where C lies to the left of B) may be similarly illustrated. If the new opportunity line PJ touches a highest indifference curve at C rather than C' (i.e., the case of dx/dR = 0), the increase in tax revenue BC correctly measures the consumption loss BC irrespective of the value of pre-existing t. On the other hand, even for this case, provided that the indifference curve at C is smooth, the increase in tax rate is still distortive in the sense that a lump sum tax of an equivalent amount would leave the indi-vidual on a higher indifference curve. This explains the point made in footnote 3 that the size of excess burden (in comparison to a lump sum tax) depends on the net (of income effect) substitution effect, while the marginal cost of fund depends on the gross substitution effect.
APPENDIX B
General Taxation may be more Corrective than Distortive
The model in Appendix A may be slightly revised to analyze the point made earlier that, in the prevalence of relative-income effects and environmental disruption effects of most production and consumption, general income and/or consumption taxes may be more corrective than distortive. For this purpose, we leave e, (1 -s)e, and se respectively out of [B1], [B2], [B4] respectively and add r ≡ y/Y (where r stands for relative income, Y for average income) into the utility function in [B1] to capture the relative-income effects and regard E as a decreasing function of Y (i.e., E Y < 0) to capture the environmental disruption effects. Instead of [B1], [B2] and [B4], we now have: U(y, x, r, g, E) 
And the first equation (the second one vanishes) of first-order condition [B3] becomes:
Going through with similar manipulation as in Appendix A and noting that y = Y and dy = dY, we may then derive:
Substitute dy/dg from the differentiation of [B2'] and dt/dg from the differentiation of [B4'] into [B10'], yielding:
as the condition for the optimal amount of public goods provision g. Thus, even if we ignore the Kaplow principle and take the case where the provision and financing of more public spending g cause disincentive effects such that dx/dg > 0 (recalling that x is leisure), making the existence of pre-existing significant tax rate t causing significant deadweight loss (Feldstein's trapezoid) , this deadweight loss is counteracted by both the relative income effect (1 -t)(U r /U y )/Y and the environmental disrup-tion effect -(U E /U y )E Y, since U r > 0 and E Y < 0, 1 > t > 0. Moreover, independent of the value of dx/dg, the environmental disruption effect -(U E /U y )E Y has to be subtracted from the R.H.S. of [B10"] in determining the optimal g, possibly necessitating a benefit/cost ratio for public goods of less than one. At one stage, I was much puzzled by this double counting of the environmental effect, once in offsetting the pre-existing tax-rate (t) effect of the disincentive effect dx/dg, and once by itself. A little reflection convinces that these double effects are not illicit double counting and can be explained. In the presence of environmental disruption effect of Y, at least part of the pre-existing tax rate t is corrective than distortive, explaining the disincentive-offsetting effect of the environmental disruption effect. On top of this, in our current formulation where E decreases with Y but not with g (more on this below), an increase in g contributes to environmental quality E by reducing Y, explaining the role of the last term in the R.H.S. of [B10"]. This independent term also means that, even if there is no disincentive effect (dx/dg = 0) due to the Kaplow principle or whatever, the environmental disruption effect still has to be taken into account to reduce the required benefit/cost ratio for public goods.
It may be correctly queried that at least some public goods also have environmental disruption effects. If we take E to be also decreasing in g and assume similar disruption effects, i.e., E g = E y , the last term in fact drops out from [B10"] with the rest of [B10"] remaining unchanged. Thus, to avoid illicit double counting, we should either: (A) Use [B10"] but in estimating the marginal valuation on a public good in the L.H.S. of [B10"], deduct any environmental disruption effects of the public good from its gross benefits; (B) If such a deduction is not made and for cases where the environmental disruption effects of the public good are comparable in magnitude to those of private goods, use [B10"] without the last term. Since disruption effects may differ, alternative A is more generally applicable and should be preferred wherever the disruption effects of the public goods can be estimated. If not, alternative B may be used as an approximation. One may argue further that [B10"] still overstates the appropriate benefit/cost ratio required for public projects. In the presence of relative-income effects, the importance of private income to an individual is not fully represented by U y but by U y +U r /Y, since an increase in their income increases not only their consumption y but also increases their relative income r (at a rate 1/Y). In the estimation of the benefit of public project relative to private income, it is likely that people take the full U y +U r / Y in the comparison. Then, the appropriate benefit-cost ratio for public project should be U g / ( U y +U r /Y), which is smaller than that indicated by [B10"].
APPENDIX C Another Qualification?
Apart from the two qualifications to his argument recognized by Kaplow himself (discussed earlier) and an additional one that was also discussed earlier (and more formally in Appendix A), at one stage, I thought that the Kaplow principle was subject to another important qualification. The problem is more complicated than I first thought and is discussed below.
If the benefits of or the values placed on public spending by taxpayers depend on some variables unobservable by the government (e.g., earning abilities in Mirrlees' model), the tax adjustments that are compensatory to the benefits of higher public spending may not be feasible. (In terms of the mathematical appendix of Kaplow, if v g is a function of w, the tax adjustments in accordance to his Equation 7 on p. 531 may not be feasible.) For example, suppose that public libraries are valued more by people of higher intelligence rather than higher income. Though intelligence may be positively (which may be debatable) related to earning abilities, financing more public libraries by tax adjustments in accordance to income levels will not work in the way intended by Kaplow. In the case of police protection discussed in an earlier section, a taxpayer knows that they will pay more tax if they earn more, but they also know that if they earn more, they will benefit more from the higher police protection. Hence, higher police protection financed by higher proportional income taxation does not create disincentive effects. In the present case of libraries, an intelligent taxpayer of high income knows that they now have to pay higher tax if they earn more. There are now better libraries that they highly value; hence they are not made worse off by the combined changes in taxation and spending. However, they will benefit more from the better libraries whether they earn more or not. Hence, there will be higher disincentive effects due to the higher tax-rates, despite the higher benefits from the spending side. This suggests a higher benefit/cost ratio for such cases.
However, the above potential qualification to the Kaplow principle is itself subject to the following qualification. While there are items of public spending that have the above property (of being valued more by people on higher income levels not because of actual higher incomes but because of certain aspects associated with earning abilities), there are items of the opposite property, i.e., being valued more by people on lower income levels, not because of actual incomes, but because of certain aspects associated with earning abilities. For example, suppose that the advice on basic job application skills by the government employment service is valued more by people of low earning abilities. If more of such advice is provided, compensatory tax adjustments will involve taxing/subsidizing the poor more/less by an amount more than the increased taxes on the rich. Then, although the spending side does not offer positive incentives (as the benefits are ability-related rather than income-related), the change in the taxation/subsidy side increases the incentive to earn incomes, since the tax/ subsidy structure has been made less progressive. A lower benefit/cost ratio is then suggested for such cases. Our discussion here is consistent with the analysis of Boadway and Keen (1993, pp. 469-71) , which indicates a higher/lower benefit/cost ratio if people with higher abilities value the public good less/ more. Vol. 53 no. 2 (June 2000) pp. 253-272 If certain items of government spending are ability-related rather than income-related, the use of compensatory tax changes that leave each income group no worse off may produce either positive or negative disincentive effects. Which effects are likely to dominate? There are two opposing considerations. First, if public spending is sort of neutral in its distributional bias, some items should benefit people with higher earning abilities more and some should benefit people with lower earning abilities more, subjectively. However, in terms of marginal valuation (marginal utility divided by the marginal utility of a dollar), the rich should have higher values because of their higher incomes. This consideration tends to suggest that the positive disincentive effects should dominate. On the other hand, at least in modern democracies, the consideration of vote maximization gives government spending a bias in favor of people with lower earning abilities, at least relative to their marginal valuations as dictated by pure efficiency considerations. (However, to some extent, this is offset by the disproportionate public influence, relative to their population size, of the rich.)
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It is unclear how Kaplow would deal with the possible dominance of positive disincentive effects due to the benefits of public spending being related to earning abilities rather than to incomes. He could argue that, as the benefits are not related to actual incomes, the higher spending should be financed by a lump sum tax. No distortionary costs are involved. However, people on some income levels may be made worse off even as separate groups at the respective (same) income levels, i.e., one group at each income level. On the other hand, if com-pensatory tax adjustments are made such that each and every income group is not made worse off as a group, disincentive effects may be involved as shown above.
How does the consideration of this appendix affect the principle of "a dollar is a dollar?" If the aged (or the crippled) have low earning abilities and the society wants to help them, the principle of "a dollar is a dollar" says that the society may use age (or health) as a consideration in its general tax/transfer scheme, but should not subsidize the consumption of some specific items by the aged in the absence of some efficiency considerations. Thus, no qualification of the principle of "a dollar is a dollar" is needed. On the other hand, if we know that advice on basic skills of job application is beneficial more to people of low earning abilities (rather than low incomes), then the provision of such advice somewhat beyond that dictated by the pure efficiency (benefit/cost ratio of one, "a dollar is a dollar") may be justified, if we cannot tax/transfer in accordance to earning abilities. The Kaplow principle may be said to be subject to this qualification, but is not really violated as the departure from the benefit/cost ratio of unity may be either positive or negative, contrary to the orthodox position of positive departure in all cases. Similarly, the principle of "a dollar is a dollar" is also subject to this qualification but is not incorrect. In particular, my "a dollar is a dollar" proposition (Ng, 1984 (Ng, , p. 1038 remains valid, as that proposition shows the Pareto inferiority of a 'purely equality-oriented' policy, while the desirability of the above-mentioned advice of job application is partly based on its efficiency in having low disincentive effects.
